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Congress has once againpassed a disaster assistanceprogram for farmers. This
time the drought of 2001 and 2002
was the rationale for the legislation.
(For a review of the build-up to the
current disaster aid package, see
“Disaster Assistance: How Best to
Pay When Nature Has Her Way,” in
the Fall 2002 Iowa Ag Review, avail-
able at www.card.iastate.edu/
iowa_ag_review/fall_02/
article4.html.) In 1998, 1999, 2000,
and 2001, the rationale was low
market prices. The current disaster
assistance program pays crop farm-
ers if their harvested yield was less
than 65 percent of the average
yield. The cost of the crop assis-
tance package is estimated at about
$2.1 billion. While this might seem
relatively modest, it is important to
recognize that the crop insurance
program will pay out more than $4
billion in 2002, and it paid out al-
most $3 billion in 2001.
What is it about the crop insur-
ance program that makes it an inad-
equate assistance tool? After all,
Congress passed the Agricultural
Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000
to better enable farmers to with-
stand financial downturns. Did ARPA
have its intended effects?
Crop insurance works by making
up the difference between harvested
yield (for traditional Multiple Peril
Crop Insurance) or harvested yield
times market price (for revenue in-
surance) and a farmer’s chosen in-
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The combination of a federaldisaster program and priva-tized crop insurance is work-
able. The federal disaster program
would cover widescale agricultural
disasters. These disasters are what
prevent privatized crop insurance
from working today. A single agricul-
tural disaster would wipe out most
private companies. With a federal
disaster program in place, private
crop insurance would provide cov-
erage that would pay any losses that
exceed the federal payment. Farm-
surance guarantee. The maximum
guarantee available includes a 15 per-
cent deductible, and no insurance
payout is made until the loss covers
the deductible. Advocates of ARPA
felt that if farmers would reduce their
deductibles, then the additional in-
demnities that would flow in difficult
years would enable Congress to avoid
passing annual disaster assistance.
The easiest way to get somebody
to buy more of something is to lower
its price, and that is what Congress
did with crop insurance. Farmers
have discovered that the amount of
subsidy available to them on a per-
acre basis increases under ARPA
when they purchase a lower-deduct-
ible policy, so naturally, farmers
moved in that direction.
The top map shows that the av-
erage coverage level—which is sim-
ply 100 percent minus the
deductible—in every state before
ARPA (1998) was less than 65 per-
cent, which means that the average
deductible in every state was
greater than 35 percent. The bot-
tom map shows that ARPA in-
creased the average coverage level
in every state. Across all states,
the average coverage level in-
creased from less than 59 percent
to almost 67 percent. That is, ARPA
had its intended effect.
Farmers have amplified their
insurance coverage since 1998 by
about $9 billion, through increasing
both insured acreage and coverage
per acre. The taxpayer cost of this in-
creased coverage is about $1 billion
per year. Is this money well spent?
On the surface, we might con-
clude that the billion dollars per year
is wasted. After all, why spend a bil-
lion if Congress is still going to bail
farmers out with a disaster program?
But maybe a more telling question is,
How much would Congress have given
farmers if ARPA had not been in
place? Perhaps the additional cover-
age farmers purchased under ARPA
acted as a restraint on Congress’s pro-
pensity to give farmers assistance.
Conceivably crop farmers would have
received $5 billion rather than $2.1
billion. If so, then taxpayers came out
ahead by $1.9 billion because of ARPA!
Regardless of what kind of “spin”
is used to describe the role of ARPA
and disaster assistance programs,
we can only conclude that ARPA has
failed to wean farmers completely
from federal disaster assistance.
Perhaps it is time to throw in the
towel and do away with federally
subsidized crop insurance. Surely
there must be a less bureaucratic
way of providing financial assis-
tance to farmers when regional di-
sasters hit. After all, we have found
a way to pay farmers when national
prices fall. Why not find a way to
pay farmers when regional yields
fall? As shown in the accompanying
sidebar, a combination of a new fed-
eral countercyclical payment pro-
gram that covers widespread yield
disasters and individualized add-on
coverage that is privately provided
could offer a high level of risk pro-
tection without the problems of our
current system. 
An Alternative to the Current System
ers would decide if the federal pro-
tection was adequate for their needs
or whether the additional private
coverage was worth the cost, which
they would pay in full.
The current crop insurance pro-
gram costs roughly $3 billion per
year. A federal disaster program
could pay farmers when county rev-
enue falls below a certain percentage
of average county revenue for a crop
within a year. We estimate that the
cost of this program at a 95 percent
payment trigger level would average
$2.65 billion per year. The federal
program could be designed to
cover losses at the state or crop-
reporting district level, which
would lower costs, or it could pro-
vide coverage for yield losses. With
a stable federal program in place,
private insurers could determine
adequate insurance rates, and pro-
ducers would have plenty of op-
portunities to address their risk
management needs.
